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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L. P. BENTLEY and CLARICE E. 
BENTLEY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Respondent, 
LOWELL E. POTTER, 
Defendant, 
Appellant .. 
Case No. 18241 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought in the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County for breach of a mining lease. The 
plaintiff-respondent sought payment for damages to the leased 
premises and judgment for monies -due under the lease. The 
plaintiff-respondent also sought judgment for money due on the 
sale of a truck. The defendant-appellant later counterclaimed 
for misrepresentation and for conversion of a trailer. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was heard by the Honorable Horner F. 
Wilkinson without a jury. The Court denied the 
defendant-appellant's Counter Claim for misrepresentation, 
ordered the plaintiff-respondents to return the trailer and 
granted the plaintiff-respondents judgment in the sum of 
$19,375.46 for the various damages claimed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-respondents seek modification of the 
judgment to correct errors in the determination of the date of 
termination of the lease and also in the method of determining 
damages. In all other respects the Plaintiff-respondents seek 
affirmance of the Court's judgment and findings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 1, 1978 these part~es entered into a mining 
lease. The lease required in its relevant parts for the lessee 
(defendant-appellant) to make payment of minimum annual 
royalties, to complete the annual assessment work as required by 
2 
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federal law, and to properly care for and operate the leased 
premises during mining and to return the premises in good 
condition upon completion of mining. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "l"). 
The defendant-appellant entered into possession of the 
leased premises, cleared overburden from a portion of the ore 
(T-20, T-172) and thereafter failed to do any further work, 
(T-18) failed to make payment of the minimum royalty, (T-16) and 
failed to complete the annual assessment work (T-18, T-19). In 
addition, the overburden that was removed was left on top of the 
ore and in the access roadway without further removal to a site 
proper for the placement of the overburden so as to permit future 
mining (T-24). Such placement of the overburden was improper and 
damaging to the leased premises (T-100-104, T-109). 
The plaintiff-respondents made numerous demands that 
the assessment work be done, that the minimum royalty be paid and 
that the overburden be removed (T-26). On August 10, 1979, the 
plaintiff-respondent caused a letter from his attorney to be 
delivered to the defendant-appellant demanding correction of the 
placement of the overburden and completion of assessment work. 
(T-23 Exhibit "2"). On December 4, 1979, after the 
defendant-appellant had failed to respond to the demand in any 
way (T-23) , the plaintiff-respondents commenced suit seeking 
damages for breach of covenants under the lease and for money due 
on the sale of a dump truck. (See Pleadings P. 3 and T-32) . 
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On March 5, 1980, after the defendant-appellant had 
still failed to cure the breach of the lease (T-33) , the 
plaintiff-respondent caused a Notice of Termination of the lease 
to be delivered to the defendant-appellant and to his attorney. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13). 
The court in its Findings of Fact and Memorandum 
Decision found that there was an enforceable lease supported by 
consideration and that there was a breach thereof by the 
defendant-appellant in failing to make minimum royalty payments, 
in failing to do annual assessment work and in failing to take 
proper care of the leased premises. The court found that the 
lease required 60 days notice prior to termination and that the 
notice dated August 10, 1979, was such notice as required. The 
court further found that the commencement of suit on December 4, 
1978, was in effect a termination of the lease and not the letter 
of termination dated March 5, 1980. The court further found that 
the defendant had personally assumed the liability for the 
balance of $1000.00 due for a dump truck sold by 
plaintiff-respondents to defendant-appellant's corporation. 
In determining damages the court ruled that the lease 
was terminated on December 4, 1979. The court found that the 
defendant owed $2500. 00 for minimum royalty payments from 
December 1, 1978 to November 30, 1979 and a prorata amount of 
$27. 44 for December 1, 1979 to December 4, 1979; that the 
defendant owed assessment work in the amount of $5000.00 for May 
4 
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1, 1978 to April 30, 1979 which work was accomplished but that 
the defendant-appellant owed $848.02, as a prorated amount for 
the period May 1, 1979 to December 4, 1979. The court found that 
the damages attributable to the defendant-appellant for improper 
placement of the overburden was $15,000.00, although the total 
damages to the leased premises were $25,000.00. 
The plaintiff-respondent does not contest the 
$15,000.00 figure but does contest the prorationing of assessment 
work liability and the prorationing of the minimum royalty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SEPARATE ACTIONS MAY BE BROUGHT FOR SEPARATE AND 
DISTINCT BREACHES OF A DIVISIBLE CONTRACT AND AT THE 
TIME OF THE BREACH WITHOUT TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT. 
-A-
The law is well established under generally accepted 
principles of contract law that 
"Where a parties' performance is 
several or is divisible into 
separate and distinct acts, so that 
the contract is subject to separate 
and distinct breaches, recovery for 
the breach of one separate and 
independent provision will not 
preclude a subsequent suit for a 
distinct breach of a different 
condition" 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions 
Sections 135, and 137 at p. 652. 
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Also, if certain covenants are susceptible of more than one 
breach, then there may be as many causes of action as there are 
breaches • See 1 Arn Jur 2d Actions Sections 138 and 140. Also 
see Corbin on Contracts Section 956. The rule has been applied 
to a covenant to make repairs in a lease, See Beach v. Crain, 2 
N.Y. 86 (1845); and also has been held to provide for successive 
actions for breach of a covenant to pay royalties. See Fifield 
v. Biesanz, 209 N.W. 259, 167 Minn. 399 (1926). 
The corollary to these rules is that "A cause of action 
in contract accrues at the time of the breach or failure to do 
the thing agreed". See 1 Arn Jur 2d Actions Section 89, also 
Corbin on Contracts, Section 948. Thus, for example, a 
contractor may sue for installments accruing under the terms of 
an entire building contract as they become due and need not wait 
until the building is complete, Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103 
Md 235, 63 A. 471 (1906); or a party may sue under a covenant to 
repair before termination of the lease, Corbett v. Derman Shoe 
Company, 155 N.E. 2d 423 (1959). 
In Corbett there were two covenants: One to repair and 
one to redeliver in good condition. The suit for failure to 
repair was commenced prior to termination of the lease which 
happened three years later. The court held that there was a 
separate cause of action for breach of the covenant to repair and 
that the covenant of redelivery did not preclude such an action 
prior to termination. 
6 
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Thus on the facts before this court the 
plaintiff-respondent had the right to bring a cause of action for 
the failure to complete the assessment work for 1978, and another 
for failure to do the assessment work for 1979, and still another 
for failure to operate in a workmanlike manner. All of the above 
are separate an divisible covenants of the lease which are also 
susceptible of continuing or multiple breaches. 
This case is different from those where the party seeks 
prospective damages or an action based on antincipatory breach 
requiring a repudiation of the contract. Accordingly, although 
there is authority for the proposition that suit upon a covenant 
to return the premises in a condition similar to that at time of 
entry cannot be brought until the end of the term, such authority 
is not applicable to this case as it was originally brought. The 
lease was not repudiated as was the plaintiff-respondents' right. 
Under the facts before the court the 
plaintiff-respondent sought repayment for assessment work done, 
and correction of certain activities that were believed to be in 
violation of the covenant to proceed in a workmanlike manner. 
Thus, the commencement of the law suit was not a termination of 
the lease. The plaintiff-respondent hoped the 
defendant-appellant would cure the default and continue to 
operate the leased premises c It was not until the breach 
continued and the plaintiff-respondent chose for additional 
reasons to terminate the lease on March 5, 1980, that the 
7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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obligations of the defendant-appellant ceased. It wa.s 
subsequently to this notice that the complaint was amended to 
seek damages for minimum royalties due and for failure to return 
the premises in proper condition. (See Pleadings P. 34). 
Thus, it was improper for the Court to rule that 
December 4, 1979, the date of commencement of suit, was the date 
of termination of the lease rather than March 5, 1980, the date 
of Notice of Termination. 
follows: 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S DETERMINATION 
OF DAMAGES WAS IMPROPERLY PRORATED 
FOR PARTIAL YEARS 
-A-
The lease provided at Section III B. Minimum Royalty as 
The lessee, beginning on the 1st day of 
December, 1978, and on the 1st day of 
December of each and every year 
thereafter, so long as this lease shall 
remain in force and effect shall pay to 
the lessors an annual minimum royalty as 
follows; to-wit: $2,500.00 for each of 
the twelve month periods ending November 
30, 1979 and November 30, 1980 and $5000 
for each successive twelve (12) month 
period thereafter. (Emphasis added) 
8 
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The plaintiff having proved that the lease was valid is 
entitled to enforcement according to its terms. The payments 
were due December 1, 1978 and December 1, 1979 for $2500.00 each 
year following. The court awarded only $27.44 for the second 
year. Plaintiff-respondent makes two alternative exceptions to 
this findinge 
1) The payments should not be prorated. By the clear 
unequivical language of the lease the payment was due December 1, 
1979. The defendant-appellant testified at trial that this was 
his understanding of the lease terms (T-190) • The payment would 
be offset by actual production if any but in no other way. The 
plaintiff had no obligation to prorate the amount when the breach 
and termination were totally the result of the 
defendant-appellant's non-performance. 
2) The date of termination was not the date of suit 
but rather March 5, 1980 and thus if the payment should be 
prorated it should be prorated from December 1, 1979 to March 5, 
1980. See the discussion of date of termination under Point I. 
-B-
The assessment work was also prorated from May 1, 1979 
to December 4, 1979. 
The lease provides at Section VII "The lessee agrees to 
do and perform all of the annual assessment work required by law 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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in order to maintain each and all of the unpatented mining 
claims". (Emphasis added). The amount required to be done was 
found by the court to be $100. 00 per year per claim for 14 
claims. This was in accordance with the subsequent portion of 
Section VII which states "Such a.nnual assessment work shall 
comply with the provisions of all Statutes, including the 
provision that not less than $100.00 per year be expended for the 
benefit of each claim." The year referred to by the lease was 
the federal mining law year not the lease year. This amount 
should not have been prorated. 
Under federal law, assessment work must be completed 
before August 31st of the year. The failure to complete the work 
as of December 4, 1979, was failure under the federal law for the 
entire year, since the plaintiffs had to have the work done by 
that time and recorded by December 31, 1979 to preserve his right 
to the claims. The assessment work was not properly prorated for 
a partial year from May 1 to December 4 since the lease year has 
no relation to the federal law. 
In addition the plaintiff-respondents again assert that 
the lease was terminated as of March 5, 1980 rather than December 
4, 1979 and that if prorationing was proper the date should have 
been until the later date. 
10 
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-c-
No evidence was introduced at trial that the parties 
intention or interpretation of these paragraphs for determination 
of damages was consistant with the interpretation imposed by the 
Court. The lease language is clear and unambiguous on these 
points. It was improper for the court to impose upon the parties 
its own terms for prorationing. Damages should be determined 
according to the clear language of the lease without 
modification. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT MADE NO WARRANTIES AS TO TITLE 
AND DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT DAMAGED 
BY ANY FAILURE OF TITLE. 
The defendant-appellant's basic excuse for 
non-performance at trial was an alleged "failure of title". The 
defendant-appellant was never definite as to when this concern 
about title arose but at one point testified that it was about 
the 90 days preceding the amendment of the lawsuit in the fall of 
1980. (T-180) 
Failure of title was not asserted in response to the 
letter of August 10, 1979 or as a defense in the Answer filed 
January 17, 1980. It was not until December 19, 1980 when the 
11 
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Answer was first amended that it was first asserted that only two 
of the fourteen claims were not properly filed with the B.L.M. 
On December 24, 1980, the Answer was amended again and it was 
then asserted that the claims were improperly filed as placer 
rather that lode claims. 
It was shown at trial that the defendant-appellant 
himself had hired an individual to file the lode claims over the 
claims of the plaintiff-respondent in October of 1980 one year 
after the commencement of the law suit. (T-204) 
-A-
The owner of an unpatented claim is entitled to mine, 
remove and sell all valuable mineral deposits within his claim 
boundaries that are not subject to extralateral rights of 
adjacent claim owners. The claimant is also entitled to such 
surface rights as are necessary for mining operations. Fee title 
remains with the Federal government until patent issues. The 
right of a claimant is an exclusive possessory interest in the 
claim which can be sold, leased, mortgaged or inherited without 
infringing the paramount title of the Untied States. See 
generally, J. Maley Handbook of Mineral Law, Second Edition 1979 
p. 203. 
12 
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The defendant-appellant admitted he was never excluded 
from the claims and that his right to possession was never 
challenged. (T-196-197) 
A claim is a right exclusive to other occupation for 
mining of the same mineral. The lease recognized these factors 
by providing under Article XII Title to Leased Premises. 
If the Lessors; interest in the mineral 
rights in the Leased Premises, or in the other 
necessary rights required to enable the Lessee to 
operate and develop the Leased Premises in the 
manner contemplated herein, is less than whole, 
and the title failure affects the mining 
operations then being conducted, the production 
royalties payable hereunder shall be 
proportionately reduced in accordance with the 
proportion that the number of acres affected by 
such title failure bears to the total number of 
acres included within such claim affected. 
The Lessee shall not be deemed to be in 
default in payment of any production royalties 
hereunder while the title of the Lessors' is 
challenged by any third person or while any third 
person appears of record to have any right, title 
or interest adverse to the Lessors, if such 
production royal ties are paid to a bank or 
reputable escrow agent; provided, however, that if 
such adverse interest affects only a part of the 
Leased Premises or a part of the interest of the 
Lessors therein, the foregoing provision shall 
apply only if the Lessee shall pay to the Lessors 
such part of the total royalty as is applicable to 
the land or interest not affected by such adverse 
claim. If the Lessors hereafter acquire any 
additional interest or title in the Leased 
Premises, then this Lease shall cover such 
additional after acquired interest. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the minimum 
royalty payable hereunder shall not be reduced 
because of any failure of the Lessors' title, 
unless the Lessee is prevented from mining all of 
the Leased Premises by order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction. In that event, the 
minimum royalty shall be suspended until such 
order is vacated. The minimum royalty for such 
13 
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Lease 
year shall be prorated. (emphasis added) 
And again the lease provides at Article I Grant of 
The Lessors hereby grant, lease and let 
exclusively unto the Lessee, all of their right in 
and to those certain unpatented placer mining 
claims (hereinafter [sic] referred to as the 
"Leased Premises" described in Exhibit "A". 
Thus the lessee is expected to mine the land and if 
there is a defect that affects the ability to mine, then there 
are to be adjustments, not termination of the lease. But there 
were no interferences with the defendant's possession. 
-B-
Mining claims are located upon a discovery of a 
valuable mineral. Two types of mineral claims are possible: lode 
and placer. A lode claim is locatable upon discovery of a vein or 
lode "of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver, 
cinnabar, lead, tin, copper or other valuable deposits (30_ U.S.C. 
Section 23). A placer claim may be located for "all forms of 
deposit, excepting veins of quartz or other rock in place" (30 
u.s.c. Section 35). Uncommon varieties of building stone may be 
located with placer-type claims pursuant to the Act of August 4, 
1892 (30 u.s.c. Section 161) on lands that are chiefly valuable 
for building stone. See Maley supra at 203. 
Defendant-appellant asserts the claims should be lode 
claims although the Lease clearly indicates it is a Lease of 
14 
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placer claims. (See Exhibits to lease Exhibit "A") . 
Defendant-appellant asserts the material is usable as 
"chickenfeed" (T-203), and therefore locatable as a lode. This 
is akin to a lessee claiming that a lead-zinc ore that is usable 
as a building stone should be filed on as a placer claim rather 
than as a lode claim and thereby defeat the rights of a lessor to 
the mineral royalties. The rule is that the primary economic use 
controls the method of location. See Maley, Supra. The primary 
economic use and value was established at trial by 
plaintiff-respondent's expert as an uncommon variety building 
stone. 
In a recent case, U~ted States v. Mamie Vaughn, 56 
IBLA 247 (July 24, 1981) the court held Dolomitic marble (which 
is similar to the arago~.te claims of plaintiff-respondent) had a 
distinct and special value as building stone and was present in 
marketable quantities and therefore was an uncommon variety and 
locatable by a placer claim. 
-c-
Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy Management Act 
of 1976 (43 U.S.C. Section 170) required that a claimant of an 
unpatented claim file a notice of claim with the B.L.M. office by 
October 22, 1979. 
Federal Law (30 U.S.C. Section 28) requires assessment 
work of not less than $100.00 per claim be performed each year 
15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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beginning September 1st of each year and be recorded on or before 
December 31 of each year. 
Prior to issuance of patent the Bureau of Land 
Management may challenge the validity of a mining claim for a 
variety of reasons. Proceedings are begun by service of a 
complaint and administrative proceeding are held within the 
Department of Interior. 
The certified record on exhibit with the court in this 
case gives the following evidence: (Defendant's Exhibit "14"). 
1. Annual Assessment work was filed for 1980 on 
September 2, 19 8 0 by Lloyd Bentley 
(plaintiff-respondent) . 
2. On September 4, 1979 an evidence of assessment 
work was filed for the 1979 year ending August 30 
by Lloyd Bentley (plaintiff-respondent) . 
3. A document dated July 24, 1980 was sent to the 
plaintiff-respondent (care of the 
defendant-appellant) as Notice of Deficiency for 
filing the Amended Notice of Location instead of 
the original instrument of recordation for claims 
Sno-King No. 1, White Could No. 1, White Queen 
Nos. 1 and 2, White Dragon Nos. 1 and 2. 
4. On July 30, 1979 plaintiff-respondent filed 
the original Notices of Location for White Queen 
No. 1 and No. 2. 
16 
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5. On August 21, 1980 a copy of the original 
Notice of Location was filed for Sno-King No.1, 
White Cloud No. 1, White Dragon Nos. 1 and 2. 
6. Subsequently all July 24 Deficiency Notices 
have been marked "satisfied" by the B.L.M. office 
as indicated on the official copies before the 
court. 
Thus, the official B.L.M. record shows no deficiency, 
and no pendency of hearing by B.L.M. to challenge the claims. 
The only challenges are the lode claim filed at the direction of 
defendant-appellant himself for the same mineral one year after 
the law suit commenced. As stated previously only uncommon 
varieties chiefly valuable as building stone may be claimed and 
only by a placer claim. 
In summary, the defendant-appellant's claim of title 
defect is without any basis in law or fact and is asserted 
without prior notice as a spurious attempt to deter the 
plaintiff-respondent's action. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT AS 
DETERMINED FROM TESTIMONY OF THE 
WITNESSES SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE 
SINCE THEY ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Findings by the trier of fact are entitled to a 
presumption of validity and upon appeal all evidence and 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom should be 
viewed in the light most favorable to support the Findings and 
Judgment of the trial court. Catler v. Bower, 543 P. 2d 1349 
(Utah 1975). Briefly considered, the factual questions raised by 
the defendant-appellant in his brief are responded to as follows: 
1. Lack of consideration. The mutual covenants 
together with the actual taking of possession by the 
defendant-appellant demonstrates that there was adequate 
consideration to support the lease agreement. The issue of title 
has been separately treated under Point IV and shows no lack of 
title or consideration. 
2. Damages resulting from placement of the overburden. 
The trial court determined that the actual damages were 
$25,000.00 but were to be reduced to off-set any contribution or 
failure on the part of the plaintiff-respondent to mitigate the 
damages. such determination involving a balancing of a variety 
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of factors are particularly well suited to the judgment of the 
trier of fact who has before him all the witnesses and evidence. 
The court's findings are clearly supported by evidence 
including testimony of the plaintiff-respondents and the 
plaintiff-respondents' expert that the placement was improper, 
was not consented to and was damaging because of its location 
over the ore and in the path of the road. 
3. Acknowledgment of liability for the dump truck. 
The defendant continually admitted at his deposition and at trial 
(T-213,214) that he was personally responsible for the debt owing 
for the truck. 
The admission although verbal is not affected by the 
Statute of Frauds Section 25-5-4 U.C.A. since this was a finding 
of the court not an attempt to enforce a verbal promise. If a 
party seeks enforcement of an agreement that is within the 
Stature of Fraud, testimony of the oral agreement is not 
admissible. But, if a party admits to an agreement in Court 
without objection, then the Stature of Frauds does not bar 
enforcement of the agreement. W.W. & Co. B. Gardner, Inc. v. 
Pappas, 24 U. 2d 264, 470 P. 2d 252 (1970). Once admitted the 
facts were before the court to support the judgment. 
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SUMMARY 
In summary, the judgment should be upheld to the extent 
that there was a finding of breach of the lease and damages to 
the plaintiff-respondent resulting therefrom. The amount of the 
damages should be recomputed. The remainder of the Court's 
judgment is supported by the facts and the law and should not be 
reversed. 
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